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The effects and ideas described by Han, Lerner, and Keltner (2007) are fascinating and 
important. Rightly so, they are likely to capture researchers' and practitioners' attention for 
some time. This commentary offers several questions (and speculations as to possible 
answers) that hopefully will be the focus of some of that attention. One theoretical question 
concerns the mechanisms whereby emotional carryover effects occur and the purposes that 
such effects might serve. A practical one is about the prescriptive implications of carryover 
effects and appraisal tendency influences more generally, particularly in  concrete, real-life 
decision situations. 
Han, Lerner, and Keltner (2007) discuss a host of intriguing 
phenomena and ideas, but the facts and proposals do more 
than just fascinate. They are likely to have significant and 
lasting impact on judgment and decision scholarship gener- 
ally as well as in the specialized domain of consumer 
behavior. Because the findings are often so surprising, they 
will force us to work especially hard to make sense of them 
and, therefore, deepen significantly our understanding of 
how people decide fundamentally. As is always the case in 
instances like this, that work will be directed toward 
answering fairly specific questions inspired by Han et al.'s 
analysis. These remarks pose several questions that are at 
the top of my personal list. In some cases, I simply ask the 
questions. In others, though, I cannot resist offering what 
seem to me to be some plausible potential answers, too. 
Hopefully, my curiosity will be satisfied by future studies if 
the questions cannot be answered (perhaps by Han et al.) on 
the basis of work already in the literature. 
THE APPRAISAL-TENDENCY FRAMEWORK- 
CONCRETELY 
The Appraisal-Tendency Framework (ATF), as described 
by Han et al. (2007) and in the literature more generally, is 
an undeniably compelling and useful set of ideas. Neverthe- 
less, its concepts and propositions are framed in terms that 
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are unusually abstract and hard to pin down, by the customs 
of judgment and decision-making psychology and market- 
ing research. Among other things, this limits the testability 
and application of the framework. For instance, it is unclear 
what, exactly, is being appraised when the framework 
speaks of "appraisal tendencies." Thus, my first question is 
simple and uninteresting but essential, it seems: What, con- 
cretely, are the various constructs of the framework, and 
how can we recognize their manifestations in real "decision 
l ife? 'In what follows, I briefly sketch specific decision- 
making interpretations that seem consistent with what has 
been written in the ATF literature, but are my interpreta- 
tions really consistent with the original intent? 
Figure 1 sketches a possible instantiation of the ATF in 
the context of a decision-making episode. As always (cf. 
Yates, 2003), the episode starts with the acknowledgment 
that a problematic situation exists (or is impending)-for 
example, that one's job is threatened. Per the ATF, that 
leads to an emotion or an appraisal of the situation that is in 
a recursive, mutually reinforcing relation with that emo- 
tion-that is, the emotion (e.g., fear) might come first, then 
lead to a particular kind of appraisal of the situation (e.g., 
that it is a "fear-type" situation), or vice versa (e.g., there is 
first an appraisal that the situation is of the fear type and 
this, therefore, evokes a sense of fear). Then two alternative 
paths are possible. On the "logical path," the emotion and 
the appraisal predispose the person to choose and pursue a 
particular action that is directed toward solving the problem 
in question (e.g., saving one's job or gaining a new one in 
certain ways). If the situation is indeed resolved satisfacto- 
rily (i.e.. the decision succeeds), the situation has changed; 
therefore, naturally. so does its appraisal and the 
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FIGURE 1 A possible interpretation of the Appraisal-Tendency 
Framework in a decision-making context. 
corresponding emotion. If the decision fails, then none of that 
happens and, presumably, the persisting emotion and 
appraisal continue to encourage and facilitate "matching" 
kinds of actions (e.g., one is consistent with fear of the source 
of one's threatened job loss). The "carryover p a t h  is very 
different and a novel element of the ATF. There, the emotion 
and appraisal encourage and facilitate similar kinds of actions 
but those that are "ancillary" in the sense that they have no 
bearing on the situation that launched the decision episode in 
the first place (e.g., the person made fearful for his job pro- 
ceeds with unusual caution in non-job related social settings). 
Of course, this does nothing to resolve that situation, and the 
original emotion and appraisal largely remain, as implied by 
Han et al. (2007). I use the qualifier largely because the 
reviewed evidence is ambiguous on the point. Although, as 
suggested later, one can make a case that there will be some 
ameliorating effect of pursuing the carryover path. 
In a decision situation, what does the decision maker sen- 
sibly "appraise?" any aspect of the situation that bears on 
the wisdom of actions one might take to solve the problem 
in question (e.g., the formidability of the adversaries or 
competitors threatening one's job or the prospects of finding 
new employment). The ATF, building on the formulation of 
Smith and Ellsworth (1985), singles out several specific 
"appraisal dimensions" for special consideration: certainty, 
pleasantness, attention, control, anticipated efSort, and 
responsibility, mainly because there is evidence that those 
dimensions influence and distinguish various emotions. 
However, it would be useful to concretize these dimensions 
(as well as the myriad others that undoubtedly would mat- 
ter) as they are realized in decision problems. Thus, for the 
ATF to be most valuable, we would need to have answers to 
questions such as, "Responsibility for what, as it bears on 
the decision problem at hand?" (The answer, for instance, 
might be who is responsible for a threat to one's livelihood, 
to inform possible appeals or countermeasures.) 
A plausible interpretation of an ATF "appraisal" in a deci- 
sion context is the decision maker's conclusion as to the state 
of a particular germane aspect of the problematic situation. 
In one situation, for instance, the decider might conclude that 
a specific competitor, "Jane," is responsible for the threat to 
his job. In another, he might conclude that nebulous "eco- 
nomic conditions" bear the blame. The implications for what 
makes sense to do about the job problem would be radically 
different. We might envision a profile of state assessments 
for all the pertinent situation aspects, representable generi- 
cally as in Figure 2 a. A core concept of the ATF is that of 
"appraisal tendencies." In this conjectured decision interpre- 
tation, an appraisal tendency would be a distinctive pattern of 
aspect assessments that is especially likely to be observed. 
The ATF asserts that particular emotions are associated with 
particular tendencies. Substantively, this would mean that 
those emotions are associated with dispositions to expect or 
come to certain characteristic conclusions about the aspects 
in question. Figure 2 b illustrates the idea. The suggestion is 
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FIGURE 2 Possible representations of state assessment profiles: (a) 
generically and (b) in contexts of anger (A) and fear (F). 
that anger and fear have different appraisal profiles. The 
ATF asserts, specifically, that the appraisal tendencies for 
control differ greatly for anger and fear. In a given decision 
situation, "control" would have to have a particular manifes- 
tation. As suggested in the figure, in many situations, it 
seems intuitive that that manifestation would entail the 
power of the decision maker relative to that of the persons or 
forces that must be overcome to resolve or control the situa- 
tion at hand. After all, we "fear" opposition that is more 
powerful than us and which therefore can harm us, but we 
become "angry" with weaker opposition that we can over- 
whelm. More importantly, consistent with the ATF, fear pre- 
disposes us for retreat and facilitates that action. In contrast, 
anger predisposes us for attack and amplifies its ferocity. 
So, the challenge remains: What are the constructs and 
claims of the ATF for decision problems+oncretely? Are the 
suggestions presented here close, or are they entirely different? 
UNDERLYING MECHANISMS 
ATF research has provided convincing evidence of numer- 
ous striking and surprising effects. However, it remains a 
mystery how and why some of those effects occur (i.e., what 
the underlying mechanisms are). As Lerner and Keltner 
(2001) put it, the ATF maintains that phenomena such as 
emotion-keyed appraisal tendencies are functional, being 
"tailored to help the individual respond to the event that 
evoked the emotion" (p. 146). Thus, extending the previous 
illustration, an appraisal that anger is appropriate for a given 
situation would entail an assessment that the decision maker 
probably has the power to overcome the opposition that is 
present. Therefore, "attack" would not be a suicidal option to 
pursue, although it might well be fatal in circumstances giv- 
ing rise to a fear appraisal. This functionality assumption 
heightens what, in my view, is the most compelling puzzle of 
all-carryover effects. Since they have no impact on the 
original source of the emotion (see Figure I), the problem 
that grabbed the decision maker's attention and initiated the 
decision episode under way, why do carryover effects occur? 
Why, for instance, does the ambient or incidental anger a 
person brings with her into an investment situation induce 
her to make risk-seeking choices that can have no influence 
on whatever angered her in the first place? Answering ques- 
tions like these arguably should be the first order of business 
for emotions research within the ATF franchise. Several 
plausible mechanisms suggest themselves--ones involving 
coherence striving, associative networks, and "emotional 
state management," which may or may not be entirely inde- 
pendent of one another. 
Coherence Striving 
Our situations in the world are often complex and incoher- 
ent (i.e., seemingly inconsistent facts coexist). For instance, 
people we like sometimes do things we think are wrong, 
even reprehensible; an apartment we might lease has a 
beautiful layout, but is located in a bad part of town. For 
decades, enormous amounts of research have directly and 
indirectly pointed to people's abhorrence of incoherence 
and, therefore, our tendency to reconstrue apparent facts to 
reduce the contradictions we perceive. The best known clas- 
sic line of scholarship documenting such phenomena is 
identified with Festinger's (1962) cognitive dissonance 
ideas. However, there have been numerous other streams, 
including several important recent ones. 
Slovic (1966) studied respondents' judgments of target 
persons' intelligence, based on a variety of cues such as 
scores on English effectiveness, high school grades, and 
study habits. He found that, in cases where two cues contra- 
dicted each other (e.g., high English score but weak high 
school grades), participants made judgments differently 
than when the cues tended to agree (e.g., high English score 
and strong grades). In the former case, respondents tended 
to underweight one of the conflicting items, in effect, 
achieving coherence by discounting inconvenient indica- 
tions of inconsistency. More recently, Simon, Krawczyk, 
and Holyoak (2004) gave participants information early in 
the deliberation process that favored one alternative job 
offer rather than another, thereby inducing a tentative pref- 
erence for that option. Simon et al. found that this colored 
the remainder of the deliberations such that participants 
reconstrued almost all considerations (e.g., how important 
office size was) such that those features supported the tenta- 
tive preference too. Even closer to this domain, Finucane, 
Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson (2000) reported evidence of 
an "affect heuristic" that appears to contribute to a most 
interesting phenomenon-the tendency for people to 
believe that if some endeavor (e.g., nuclear power) is bene- 
ficial, then it must also entail little risk, and vice versa, that 
highly risky enterprises offer minimal benefits. (Such 
beliefs seem at odds with reality in that, usually, the world 
tolerates risky activities only because they also promise 
substantial rewards that compensate for the high risk.) It is 
not implausible that the affect heuristic is a manifestation of 
coherence striving too. Imagine a person who has come to 
support nuclear power because of its benefits. To maintain a 
sense of coherence, that person might well come to construe 
the riskiness of nuclear power to be minimal also, 
reinforcing the impression of all-around worthiness of that 
technology. 
What are the possible implications for carryover effects? 
Suppose that a particular emotion is being experienced-for 
example, fear rather than anger over the prospect of losing 
one's job. At that particular moment, fear dominates the 
person's perspective on the world. Then, in the service of 
maintaining coherence, many other things in that perspec- 
tive should be seen (and felt) as warranting fear too. There- 
fore, seemingly justifiably, decisions on matters having 
nothing to do with the original genesis of the fear (e.g., 
choosing a car seat for one's child) would have the charac- 
ter of fear-driven choices as well (e.g., risk aversion). 
Associative Networks 
A second proposed set of mechanisms underlying carryover 
effects has, in effect, been in the literature for some time, 
being suggested by Forgas (1995) in his discussion of the 
affect infusion model. However, it still seems to be a viable 
candidate as a contributor to these effects. In essence, the 
proposal suggests that when a certain emotion is experi- 
enced, it activates particular nodes in the person's associa- 
tive networks. This implies that associated facts come to 
mind or are recognized more readily than otherwise; there- 
fore, conclusions consistent with those facts seem more 
defensible than if they had not been acknowledged. Signifi- 
cantly, as far as carryover effects are concerned, associative 
network activation proceeds very rapidly and independently 
of propositional knowledge or reasoning. Therefore, they 
can seemingly "upstage" other, perhaps more reasoned, 
considerations. Therefore, if a person is in a fearful state, 
this should activate fear-like elements of the associative net- 
works of almost anything under consideration at the 
moment. Thus, the purchase of a child's car seat at that time 
would be dominated by those elements and would be unaf- 
fected by other factors that literally never enter the decision- 
maker's mind. A recent study by Chua, Yates, and Shah 
(2006) is consistent with the role of associative networks in 
carryover-like phenomena. These investigators found evi- 
dence that certain types of graphical (as opposed to numeri- 
cal) displays of risk information seem to have a rapid, 
attention-capturing impact on overall risk assessments and 
choices. Moreover, those effects appeared to, in part, be 
attached to entire decision alternatives, not just logically 
reasonable elements such as chances of harm (see Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Epstein, 1994.) 
Emotional State Management 
Considerable current scholarship in decision making centers 
on what might be called "emotional state managementu- 
people's efforts to, essentially, make themselves feel good 
emotionally, or at least not feel bad. Some of that work has 
focused on people's efforts to choose alternatives whose 
results make them feel good (e.g., Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & 
Ritov, 1997). However, other studies have emphasized the 
emotional states of decision makers while deciding. Studies 
framed in terms such as "mood maintenance," "mood 
repair," and even "mood enhancement," including those by 
Isen and Geva (1987), are representative. In a nutshell, these 
kinds of investigations demonstrate that conditions sur- 
rounding a decision-making episode affect the decider's 
emotional state. Further, the aim of making that state pleas- 
ant or at least tolerable partly dictates how and what the per- 
son decides (cf. Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 
2001). This second variety of emotional state management 
conceptually is not unlike therapies for coping with clinical 
mood disorders or, more familiarly, what people do when 
they drink alcohol to forget their troubles or to pick up their 
spirits. 
What is the relevance to carryover effects? Han et al. 
(2007) refer to each emotion's "motivational properties that 
fuel carryover" (p. 160). However, they do not elaborate on 
what they mean. Regardless, emotional state management 
considerations are a plausible driver of carryover effects 
that seem consistent with this idea. Recall Figure 1, and 
suppose that a problematic situation arises and evokes a cer- 
tain emotion (e.g., anger). Per the ATF, the associated 
appraisal tendencies predispose the person toward particular 
kinds of decision alternatives that are promising in terms of 
successfully addressing the initiated decision episode (e.g., 
protecting one's job in the face of an anger-inducing 
threat)-that is, solving the original problem provides part 
of the decision maker's incentives. However, the evoked 
emotion adds more. It seems likely that, in many instances, 
the experience of the emotion in question (e.g., fear or 
anger) is inherently unpleasant in its own right; it makes the 
person feel bad. Further, the "expression" of that emotion in 
the form of actions consistent with the associated appraisal 
tendency might, in and of itself, relieve at least part of that 
bad feeling; this should occur regardless of the object of 
such actions (i.e., as suggested in Figure 1, ancillary carry- 
over actions could indeed serve a compelling function). 
That would be why, for example, being mean to his children 
might, sadly, provide satisfaction to an angry worker wor- 
ried about his job security. 
THEREFORE?: PRESCRIPTIONS 
Han et al. (2007) submit that the ATF has significant practi- 
cal implications for consumer decision making, and they 
buttress this assertion with discussions of findings about 
risk assessments and the assessment of monetary value 
(e.g., people's willingness to pay certain amounts of money 
for particular goods). These findings are compelling, but I 
must confess to some skepticism about how readily con- 
sumers and marketers can translate ATF principles and 
findings into useful prescriptions. Surely, for instance, one 
should not advise marketers to purposely make consumers 
angry so that they would take greater risks in their pur- 
chases, right? So, what advice does make sense? This is an 
important challenge for future "translation" research. The 
precise shape that such efforts might take is unclear. How- 
ever, my hunch is that one fruitful avenue would entail 
teaching people how to manage in the event that particular 
emotions just happen to arise naturally. For example, pre- 
scriptions for consumers might begin like so: "Be aware 
that your emotional state is likely to affect significantly 
what you choose to do, and those choices might not be in 
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your long-term interests. Let me explain, and then let's con- 
sider how you can protect yourself." Advice to sellers might 
be prefaced this way: "If you notice that a customer is angry 
(or happy, sad, etc.), you might want to take into account 
what research suggests is likely to be the way that customer 
is seeing things. We can then consider how you should 
approach that person." 
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